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Director of Central Intelligence

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WEST AFRICA - GHANA:	Reactions to th	e Coup	
The recent coup in G heavals in other West Afri	can countries plagi	ued by significant	
economic disparities and p	ressures for social	l change.	2
Most West African and-see attitude towar leaders in the region events in Ghana could tries. Liberian Head plish a return to civithe most concerned.	d the new regim recognize, howe create unrest i of State Doe, w	ver, that the n their own coun- ho hopes to accom-	25
Political develop long-term socioeconomi events in Ghana. Pres fears that Ghana could hold in West Africa. cut off oil deliveries	c problems, oft ident Shagari's provide Libya Lagos, however,	government also with another foot- has made no move to	
Leaders of Togo, states suspect Libyan increasingly concerned meddle in their affair	involvement in Lthat Tripoli w	r moderate but weak the coup. They are ill attempt to	2
Comment: Ghana's ties with Libya is lik economic and security however, is not a Liby sizable Islamic popula Tripoli to gain influe	ely to lead to assistance. Coran tool and Ghartion should imp	up leader Rawlings, na's lack of a	2:
The Libyans probator now in Ghana to avof neighboring governm moreover, does not wanthis summer as host of the group later this yability to make politiin West Africa will be of providing signification.	roid increasing ents. Libyan leats to risk jeopa the OAU summit ear. In additional incompants in the mitigated by the second second incompants in the mitigated by the second second incompants in the second	the apprehensions eader Qadhafi, rdizing his role and chairman of on, the Libyans' Ghana and elsewhere heir poor record	2: 2:
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YUGOSLAVIA: Government Changes F	'orecast
Planned government changes annound that the leadership is placing a premium Foreign Affairs, Internal Security, and that nomination of a lackluster party for government may impede the search for	m on expertise in the Defense Ministries, but unctionary as the <u>new head</u>
Croatian Party leader Milka woman holding a top-level regime next Premier. Other nominations a Macedonian and former Party Pre Foreign Minister; Stane Dolanc, a Secretary until 1979, as Interior Branko Mamula, a Serb from Croati of Staff, as Defense Minister. F these four-year posts will occur Party Congress in June.	position, is to be the include Lazar Mojsov, esidium President, as a Slovene who was Party Minister; and Admiral a now serving as Chief Formal selections to
Comment: The ministerial ca to be confirmed. They are longti sive records.	andidates are certain me leaders with impres-
Mojsov and Dolanc have held and have achieved international r served as Ambassador to Moscow an General Assembly from 1977 to 197	recognition. Mojsov nd P <u>resident of</u> the UN
Dolanc, a capable administra difficult task of assisting in ma strife-torn province of Kosovo as vigorous dissident movements. He of vigilance against Soviet meddl	aintaining order in the s well as dealing with e is a strong advocate
Planinc has been unimpressive Croatian Party and will bring litto her new post. The current Presto reduce inflation and the hard appointing Planinc, the leadershiemphasizing the Premier's role intives.	ttle economic experience emier has worked hard currency debt. By ip seems to be de-

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SUDAN: Demonstrations in Khartoum Subs	ide
//Demonstrations protesting the recthe price of sugar appear to be ending Demonstrations are continuing, however, vincial towns, and early this week three killed. The number of deaths resulting tests now stands at 21.// Comment: //President Nimeiri's designar prices and his handling of the produced outspoken criticism in the leaders	in Khartoum. in several pro- e students were from the pro- cision to raise otests has pro-
Socialist Union, Sudan's only legal polition. Dissatisfaction over the regime's solve economic problems has been increase but complaints by the Socialist Union as	itical organiza- s inability to singly widespread,

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CHINA-US: Comments on Taiwan Arm	ns Decision	
Beijing's first official pre on the US decision on arms sales "unilateral" character of the mov threat of retaliation. The state critical of the public handling o spokesmen and media.	to Taiwan denounced the re but contained no ement was especially	, 25X
Comment: The commentary reirepresentations in Beijing that pthis time pose sensitive problems Chinese want to use their consultarms sales in part to reaffirm their sovereignty over Taiwan. A calls for an "immediate solution" overall tone indicates a desire temaneuver.	oublic statements at some for China. The sations with the US on at the US recognizes although the statement of the issue, its	25X
Two anti-Marcos terrorism Thr foreign embassies not to particip Film Festival that begins on Mond bomb the International Film Palac radical April 6th Liberation Move for a series of bombings in Manil an attack at the meeting of the A Travel Agents. That bombing also warning. The Movement has been lopposition.	coups have warned several cate in the International day because of plans to ce. One group, the ement, was responsible a in 1980, including american Society of was preceded by advance	25X
Comment: The Movement may bassociated with the Marcos family the International Film Palace and festival are pet projects of Mrs.	y. The construction of the holding of the	ر 25X
//The President reportedly hany extraordinary security precau he is confident that the Movement by the end of 1980.// Moreover, lowed through on other threats agtaries.	ations, possibly because was effectively quashed the group has not fol-	, 25X

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FRANCE: Economic Decrees

The government has issued two decrees that shorten the workweek from 40 to 39 hours, lengthen the standard paid vacation from four to five weeks, and reduce social security charges for firms that hire additional workers by September 1983. President Mitterrand secured limited authority from the Socialist-dominated National Assembly last November to act unilaterally on urgent social measures. The decrees are aimed at stemming growing leftist concern that Paris is moving too slowly in implementing promised social and economic policies.

Comment: Although Paris hopes that the new measures will create between 50,000 and 100,000 new jobs, the government would need to create another 150,000 jobs merely to prevent unemployment from rising above the current 8-percent level. Economic growth is likely to be closer to 2 percent than the 3-percent target set by Paris for this year, and unemployment is widely expected to rise.

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS		
USSR - NORDIC STATES:	Soviet Interference	
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Moscow's credibility, but	ions in the Nordic States have damaged Soviet efforts to shape the outcome of in Finland probably will continue even Soviet sentiments.//	25X
collection submarine, nuclear torpedoes, has of Soviet interests in mination to preserve i strengthened, and dome	in Swedish waters of an intelligence which probably was armed with adversely affected a broad range Northern Europe. Swedish detertists armed neutrality has been estic opposition in Denmark and increasing defense spending may	25X
the USSR's commitment are concluding that Mo	incident also has raised doubts about to arms control. The Nordic States oscow has a lower threshold for on its submarines in the Baltic wed.//	25X
bility of Soviet pledg against states that re Nordic Nuclear Weapons effective, and Scandin insistent on including	ne incident has undermined the credi- ges not to use nuclear weapons enounce them. Moscow's call for a s Free Zone probably will be less navians are likely to become more g Soviet nuclear weapons in and on the Kola Peninsula.//	25X
region also has damage ment in local peace mo of a Soviet diplomat f press reports of the i cials. The USSR recei	Soviet officials stationed in the ed Moscow's image. Soviet involve- ovements has led to the expulsion from Denmark and to recent Norwegian imminent expulsion of Soviet offi- ived adverse publicity earlier a Soviet official from Norway in	, , 25X
	continued	
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//Moscow probably will try to restore its credibility among Nordic audiences by diverting attention to US-Soviet INF negotiations and to its allegations of a US and NATO threat to European stability. The Soviets are likely to revive charges that US cruise missiles in Europe would violate Nordic airspace en route to Soviet targets and thereby risk involving Northern Europe in a US-Soviet nuclear exchange. The Kremlin also may charge that stockpiling NATO weapons at Danish sites could draw Denmark into a nuclear conflict.//	25X1
//Obvious Soviet efforts to shape the outcome of the Finnish presidential election being held in stages this month are increasing apprehension about Soviet intentions in Northern Europe. Moscow nevertheless will continue to encourage the election of a successor to President Kekkonen who is likely to keep Helsinki's foreign policy carefully attuned to Soviet interests. Greater emphasis on defense throughout the Nordic States and stronger conservative showings in recent Norwegian and Danish elections probably have led the Soviets to take an even greater interest in the outcome of this election.//	25X1
The Soviet Ambassador to Finland and the KGB's Fin- nish affairs expert in Helsinki were summoned to Moscow in late November, apparently to devise a more effective strategy for influencing the balloting for the first round of the presidential election on Sunday and Monday and the electoral college's deliberations on 26 January.	25X1
Although Pravda's praise of Center Party candidate Karjalainen failed to help him gain that party's presidential nomination, Moscow remains hopeful that Karjalainen will emerge as a compromise candidate in the event of a deadlock in the electoral college. Soviet officials continue to emphasize Karjalainen's extensive experience in bilateral trade negotiations and to warn against the strong anti-Kekkonen sentiment that has developed in the former President's own party.	25X1

